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The Effects of Capital Subsidization on Israeli Industry
Introduction  
Capital subsidization has been at the center of industrial policy in Israel over the
last thirty years. Its declared objectives were to encourage economic growth and
employment, as well as to improve the balance of payments and disperse the population
throughout the country.  Government intervention focused on the Law of
Encouragement of Capital Investments (1959; here after “the Law”).  This Law was
amended periodically
1, but since 1968 it has granted four main types of investment
subsidies to “approved enterprises”: grants, loans with low rates of interest (often
negative real rates), accelerated depreciation, and other tax concessions on income
derived from the investment
2.
Similar industrial strategy programs are supported by many countries. Factor
subsidies have been used extensively in European countries as important policy
instruments, usually in an attempt to reduce regional unemployment differentials
(Amstrong & Taylor (1985), Yuill et al (1989), Holden & Swales (1993)). Most
developing countries provide fiscal incentives to encourage domestic and foreign
investment.  These schemes subsidize significantly the use of capital and produce greater
capital intensity in manufacturing (Lim (1992)).  Moreover, the committee on industrial
support policies in the OECD stresses that: “Industrial subsidies often present
                                               
1 Up to the year 1990 it was changed 39 times, because of problems of implementation or changes in
investment needs.
2 Investments in equipment were entitled to grants of about 35 to 40 percent in Development Zone A, 20
percent in zone B and 0 - 5 % in the central areas.  About 40 % of the value of total investments got loans,
which were unlinked to inflation until 1981-2.  The accelerated depreciation allowance for equipment was
twice the rate of the regular one, and that for structures - 4 times. Corporate tax for approved enterprises
was 25% instead of the ordinary tax of 45% (foreign investors paid only 10%).2
impediments to structural adjustments, distort resource allocation and engender
international frictions... Reducing such subsidies is crucial for improving the flexibility
of economies and for increasing international trade on a competitive basis” (OECD
(1990)).     
Canada has had extensive experience with the subsidization of capital investment
for the purpose of regional development.
3  The degree of government involvement
reached its height in 1982 when the Canadian Government created a new Department of
Regional Industrial Expansion (DRIE) with its own cabinet minister; a department
whose mandate was to foster increased industrial activity in high unemployment regions.
While the level of subsidization has declined in recent years, as late as 1995 one billion
Canadian dollars was spent on industrial subsidies by the Canadian federal government
(Canadian Tax Foundation (1996)).     
  The leading principle embodied in the Law in Israel was the favoring of
industrial plants located in designated development zones, particularly in Galilee and the
Negev, and/or the encouragement of exports. Other general factors taken into
consideration in the selection of projects, as declared by the Investment Authority, were
the potential for creating employment, for contributing to the development of the area,
and for profitability.  A rough estimate
4 shows that the average subsidization embodied
in grants and loans alone, in the period 1970-1975, was some 20 percent of total
investment in industry (including investments that received no subsidies).  It reached
31% in 1975-80; and declined again to 15% - 20% in the eighties.  One should keep in
mind that these averages include many firms with subsidies of more than 50% of their
investments; for example - a firm investing in development area A in the second half of
                                               
3 The Atlantic Provinces are Canada’s own version of Israel’s development area A. 
4 For a detailed explanation, see Bank of Israel Annual Report 1988, pp. 37-43, 156. 3
the 1970s received an ex-post subsidy of some 60 percent only by grants and loans. In
addition, there are other benefits to investing which are not included in the estimates
presented here.
5
The main framework of the system was still functioning in the first half of the
nineties, but some alternative routes of subsidization were added: mainly government
guaranties for loans and income tax exemption for 10 years.  The tax benefits were
estimated by the State Revenues department of the Finance Ministry, to approach
approximately $300m  in 1997. Most investors (three-quarters of them) preferred the
grants however.  Approved investments entitled to subsidies in the last few years, (since
1990) accounted for some 31% of total industrial investments. The sum of actual grants
plus an estimate of the value of the alternative benefits averaged an annual 42% of the
value of approved investment in this period.
6  Grants were also the most widely used
financial instruments in OECD countries.  Many of these countries also used
government loans and tax concessions in their regional policies (OECD (1990)).
It has been claimed that capital subsidization, along with high taxes on labor,
encouraged capital-intensive industries, decreased capital utilization, caused
inefficiency, and distorted the allocation of resources in the economy.  Generally
speaking, the subsidization system in Israel and elsewhere is full of discriminations: by
destination - between production for local markets and exports; by ownership - between
local and foreign investors; by industry - manufacturing industry versus services; by
area, by type of asset (equipment versus structures), and in practice, also by size. 
As we demonstrate below, the Law caused investors to prefer physical capital to
                                               
5 Among the benefits not included are the loan guarantees that were available to firms in the 1990s as
an alternative to grants.
6 The official grant rate in development area A (where 75% of the approved investment was concentrated)
was 38%.  Accordingly, one firm  (Intel) recently received approval for a grant of 600(!) million dollars4
labor, and to establish capital-intensive plants in development areas that were profitable
to the investor but not necessarily to the economy.  Cheap capital, sometimes at a cost of
less than half its value, apparently resulted in over-investment, partial utilization of
machinery and equipment in industry, and unbalanced growth in the economy. 
The development areas did not necessarily benefit over the long term.  The high
rate of subsidization brought more investments but mainly for short periods. Many of the
subsidized plants in these areas closed down a short time after the subsidization period
ended (Lavy (1994))
7. This result suggests that the subsidy scheme is not achieving its
declared aims - participation in government subsidy schemes in order to set up new
firms in developing towns appears to be associated with shorter life span of firms. 
Similar developments have also been observed in other countries. 
It is difficult to conclude that the Law achieved substantial net development in
the southern and northern regions (mainly constituting development area A).  Although
the estimates show an increase in the rate of employment in these areas up to the
beginning of the eighties
8, we cannot tell how much is due to other reasons. (To what
extend does the number of employees in the Dead Sea Works, for example, depend on
investment subsidization?) 
The Law tried to achieve simultaneously two policy objectives that do
not necessarily coincide: preventing market failures and promoting specific areas.  In
addition, the government used a very flexible map and definitions for the development
areas, which also changed under political pressure
9.  Although market failures are
                                                                                                                                                              
for its intended investment of  $1.6 billion, in Kiryat-Gat,  in the next several years. 
7 As found in a comprehensive study by D. Schwartz (1990, 1993)
 
8 From 21% out of total employees in  the business sector in the sixties to 25% in the eighties and 26% in
the last years. 
9 For example, a specific project in Haifa was included in development area A for a short while in order to
subsidize it.5
characteristic of small firms, the government preferred large firms which could deal with
the bureaucracy and exert higher pressure on the politicians.
The overall effect of this subsidy system on the efficiency and productivity of
industrial firms is the ultimate purpose of this study, which is conducted at the
establishment level. We try to quantify the effect of capital subsidies on the productive
efficiency of firms, utilizing the production function framework.  On the one hand, the
subsidy reduces the cost of capital, leading to a substitution of capital for labor
(allocative inefficency) and perhaps inducing technical inefficiency as well.   On the
other hand, the subsidy, because it reduces the cost of capital, lowers the cost of
production (as long as input substitution occurs).  The firm can thus lower its price and
expand output and the demand for labor.  While the ultimate goal of our study is to try to
evaluate the capital subsidy policy by comparing some of the possible benefits of the
subsidization system such as output and employment growth with its costs, in this first
paper we consider only the efficiency costs. 
In the next section we will present a short description of the unique data set that is used
for this study.  The methodology is described in section 3, followed in section 4 by the
empirical results. In the first part of section 4, descriptive statistics that provide evidence
concerning the characteristics of firms that receive capital subsidies will be presented. In
the second part of section 4 production function estimates of the efficiency effects of
subsidies will be provided.  Section 5 will conclude the paper with some preliminary
policy recommendations and suggestions for further research. 
2.  The Data
Three main surveys, conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics, were used to
build the cross section - time series panel of firm data used in our study:
(1) The annual Industrial Surveys on incomes, expenditures, exports, labor inputs,
investments, and other related data on firms with five or more employees. It should be
mentioned that among the characteristics of the firm, the region in which the firm is
located is recorded, but unfortunately this is not always the case for individual plants.6
The panel covers the 1990-1994 period, and includes approximately 2,000 industrial
firms that operated in this period.
(2) A Fixed Capital Stock Survey (as of January 1, 1992)
10 was used to estimate the
firm’s capital stock by year of investment.  A unique feature of this capital stock survey
is the fact that the amounts of capital grants are recorded in the same detail as the capital
investment.  The survey is based on reports submitted to the tax authorities by the firms
in order to receive depreciation allowances.  It includes detailed data on capital assets by
type and year of acquisition.
11 Our data base is a representative unbalanced sub-sample
of the above mentioned annual Survey, and includes about 620 firms.  Constant dollar
capital stock and capital grants at the individual firm level were generated for the period
1990-1994.  Estimates for years other than 1992 were obtained by using the Survey data
as a benchmark, together with annual investment data, annual grants data, and
appropriate price deflators; utilizing the perpetual inventory method of capital stock
accumulation. 
(3) R&D surveys, conducted by the CBS annually since 1969, which cover expenditures
on R&D investment, labor input (by education) and subsidies to R&D. Censuses were
conducted in 1979, 1984, and 1990.  The R&D capital stock for every firm was
estimated from these data, assuming a depreciation rate of 1\7, and using the perpetual
inventory procedure used to estimate fixed capital services for the years 1990,91,93,94. 
Additional information - on subsidization rates, taxes, and detailed geographic
coverage of the development areas - was collected mainly from official publications of
                                               
10  Only two other Capital Surveys were conducted in Israel, one for 1968 and the other for 1982, because
of its complexity and unusual measurement difficulties. 
11 Some  firms were excluded from the panel because of statistical problems estimating their capital stock.
For the regression analysis we used information on 620 firms, out of the original survey of 727 firms,
after elimination of firms with outlying - probably wrong - basic data and firms which did not return the
capital stock survey questionaire.7
the Investment Authority.   See Regev (1993) for a detailed description of the
longitudinal panels, part of which we are using in this paper.
12
The firm data include the values of output and intermediate inputs in current and
constant prices.  The estimates of the appropriate price indexes were calculated for some
100 sub-branches of the industrial sector using various sources of price data. In some
cases there was an even finer detailed breakdown of the price data.  The overall index of
output prices for every branch is a weighted average of export prices and the wholesale
price index for sales in the domestic market.  The weights used were the real sales to the
different destinations.
The price index of intermediate inputs (materials) is based on information
regarding imports and purchases from local production as calculated in the CBS Input-
Output Tables.  The data are classified here into some 200 sub-branches of commodities
and services.  The overall materials price index is an average of import and local
production prices weighted by 1991 values from the input-output table for that year. 
  The main characteristics of the firm that serve as heterogeneity controls in the
production functions are: the size of the firm (measured by the labor input), a dummy
variable for mobility (entry and exit of firms), the qualities of labor and capital inputs
(for detailed definitions and explanations of the quality calculations see Regev (1997)),
the intensity of R&D activity, the utilization of capital by shift work, the ownership
sector (e.g., public sector, Histadrut), the industry the firm belongs to, and the year of
activity.
                                               
12 For additional descriptions of the characteristics of the data base used in this study see our previous
publications which utilize these data (Bregman, Fuss and Regev (1991,1995)).8
3.  The Methodology 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of capital
subsidization on the production structure and efficiency in the Israeli manufacturing
industries.    A firm will invest over time in a number of vintages of capital.  The
amount of investment in vintage i will depend on the user cost of capital, which in
turn will depend on the extent of subsidization current at the time the investment is
made.  It is these vintage investments and subsidies we observe in our data set.   From
these data we wish to construct an aggregate capital stock and a measure of the
intensity of subsidization embodied in the capital stock in use by a particular firm at a
point in time (t).  
According to the theory of aggregation (Leontief (1947a,b), Fisher (1965),
Hulten (1990)), an aggregate capital stock Kt exists if the relative marginal products
of vintages i and k are independent of the inputs outside of the aggregate.  In this case
the aggregate stock of capital can be calculated as
Kt  =   It,0  +  ￿ ft-i It,i                                                                                         (1)
where
It,0 = new capital investment
13
It,i = capital investment of vintage i (in efficiency units) surviving to the beginning of 
        year t
ft-i = marginal product of vintage i capital / marginal product of new capital
      = MPt,i / MPt,t ,
and the summation is over all surviving vintages of capital (i>0).
According to the neoclassical model of capital accumulation (Jorgenson
(1963), Hall and Jorgenson (1967)), the firm will expect to maximize the present
                                               
13 Kt is defined as the aggregate capital stock at the beginning of period t.  Hence It,0 is investment9
value of profits from a particular vintage i investment by investing up to the point
where the value of the marginal product of capital is equal to the user cost of capital
ci 
14,
pi MPi,i   =  ci                                                                                                     (2)           
  MPi,i   =   ci /pi                                                                                                 (3)     
where pi is the output price at time i. 
We now assume that, once an investment has taken place at time i, the
marginal product of a unit of capital does not change over time (except due to
physical depreciation)
15.  Therefore MPt,i = MPi,i .  The aggregation weights ft-i can
now be expressed as
ft-i =  MPi,i / MPt, t                                                                                          (4)
      =  (ci /pi) / (ct /pt)                                                                                     (5)
      = [(ci /qi)(qi /pi)] / [(ct /qt)(qt /pt)]                                                            (6)
where qi,qt are the capital asset prices at time i and t respectively.
We now make the simplifying assumption that the asset price - output price
ratio has remained approximately constant over vintages.  In that case, the aggregation
weights are determined by the equation
ft-i =  (ci /qi) / (ct /qt)                                                                                     (7)
For asset type j, the weights can be written as
ft-i,j =  (cij /qij) / (ctj /qtj)                                                                                 (8)
                                                                                                                                                              
during the previous period.
14 In the present value calculation, it is assumed that the firm expects all input and output prices to
inflate at a rate q, so that for any price expected at time s (expectations formed at time i), ps,i = pi e
 q(s-i).
 In that case the correct first order condition for maximization is equation (2), where the rate of return
embedded in ci is the real rate of return.
15 This assumption is known as the “putty-clay” assumption.10
To compute the weights ft-i,j we must calculate the user cost ratios cij /qij.  We begin
by defining the subsidy ratio (hereafter denoted by hij) as the subsidy per unit of
investment in asset vintage i, type j.  The grants portion of this subsidy is denoted by
gij and the loans portion by lij.  The user cost cij is determined by the equilibrium
condition that the portion of the asset price paid by the firm is equal to the (after tax)
present value to the firm of the benefits obtained from a unit of investment.  This
condition results in the equation:
                                                   
qij [1 - hij  - ui(1-gij) Zij ] = (1-ui) ￿ exp{-(ri+dj)} csj ds                                  (9)
where the integration is from s=i to ¥ , and
i = investment vintage;   j = 1,2,3 = structures, equipment, vehicles
qij = the asset price for a capital good of vintage i, type j
ri  = the real rate of interest associated with vintage i
d j= the depreciation rate for the jth type of asset
ui = the tax rate on profits associated with vintage i
gij = the grant ratio of investment
Zij= the present value of depreciation expense allowances







- - = 1
1                                                                                              (10)
In equation (9), the actual price paid by the firm is the asset price reduced by
the amount of the grant (per unit of investment), and further reduced by the per unit
present value of the income tax savings due to accelerated depreciation on that portion
of the investment which is eligible for depreciation expenses.11
We solve (9) for the user cost of capital to obtain            
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] c q r + 1-u h u ij ij i j i ij  ij i = - - - d Z gij ( ) 1 1                                                    (11)
From equation (11) it is clear that as the subsidy ratio hij increases, the user cost of
capital declines. This will induce a cost-minimizing firm to substitute capital for labor
and thus become more capital intensive. While the direction of this effect is clear from
economic theory, the empirical magnitude is unknown without the kind of empirical
analysis undertaken in this paper.  The effect is likely to be both statistically and
economically significant, since in the peak period of subsidization the user cost of capital
for a firm that received no subsidies was nearly four times larger than the cost for a firm
in Zone A  that received the maximum benefits
16.
The utilization of equation (11) as the formula for the user cost of capital implies
that the weights used to aggregate the various vintages and types of capital explicitly
incorporates the effects of the subsidies.  This definition of capital should be superior to
a definition of capital that ignores the existence of subsidies.  We will explore this issue
in the empirical section of the paper.
The final step in the construction of the capital input variable is to aggregate the
three types of capital.   As in our previous papers (Bregman, Fuss and Regev (1991,
1995)), the capital service flow was estimated as the aggregate of the service flows from
 structures, equipment and vehicles;  where the service flow from each type of asset is
depreciation plus opportunity cost (evaluated at a 5% real rate of interest).
                                               
16 This calculation is based on applying equation (11) to our subsidies data.12
4. Empirical Results
a. Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1 to 3 present some characteristics of the firms, sorted by the incidence of
capital subsidies.  The data pertain to the years 1990-94. The descriptive statistics are
based on the full sample of 727 firms, where imputations were used to construct any
missing data.  The data for these 727 firms were then expanded to the total population of
industrial firms in the Israeli economy using Central Bureau of Statistics expansion
factors (based on employment), in order to represent more accurately the whole of Israeli
industry.  All data with the exception of the first row of Table 1 are after expansion.  By
way of contrast, the regressions that follow (Tables 4 and 5) do not employ this
weighting procedure and include only the sample of 620 firms for which missing data
imputations were not necessary. 
From Table 1 it can be seen that 293 of the 727 firms (40%) received grants for
capital in use as of the date of the observation.  After expanding this sample of 727
firms, we obtain the result that over the 1990-94 period, 39% of the labor force in Israeli
industry worked for firms that utilized capital partially financed by grants. These
employment shares vary from a low of 22% in Printing and Paper to a high of 60% in
Chemicals and Plastic.  As the size of firm increases, the share increases.  As expected,
the highest percent of employment in firms with grants (70%) is in development area A,
with the next highest being development area B (52%).  Perhaps surprising is the
sizeable percentage of firms in development area A without grants (30%), and the
percentage of firms in development area C with grants (27 %). 
Table 2 provides a number of relevant economic indicators by size and incidence13
of grants.  The results in this table show that while there is some variation by size group,
on average, those firms who received grants had higher labor productivity, were more
capital intensive (higher capital/labor ratio) and had higher rates of return on capital.  
The fact that firms with grants had higher labor productivity and were more capital
intensive suggests these firms were substituting cheaper capital for labor.  The higher
labor productivity is not an indicator of greater efficiency, since a number of
characteristics (including capital intensity) varied systematically between firms with and
without grants.  We will take this variation into account in our regression analysis (Table
4), where we demonstrate that firms with grants were actually less efficient. 
The fact that firms with grants had, on average, higher rates of return on capital
stock is surprising.  It is particularly surprising since the calculation does not take into
account the leverage enjoyed by firms with grants who finance only a portion of their
capital stock.  We will return to this issue below.
Table 3 highlights the differences in economic indicators among development
areas. Firms with grants have higher labor productivity and are more capital intensive
than firms without grants, regardless of area.  With the exception of the anomalous result
in development area A
17, firms with grants had higher rates of return than firms without
grants.   Once again, the effective differences are understated since the leverage effects
on rates of return are ignored. 
The comparative rates of return suggest that some segments of the subsidization
policy have been unnecessary, or at least too generous.  In particular, consider
development area C.  In this area, the issue of locating plants in underdeveloped regions
to stimulate employment is not at issue.  The higher rates of return earned by firms that
                                               
17 The sample in this cell is small (42 firms), and the result is influenced by several firms with very
high calculated rates of return (over 1000%!) However when we remove the most unusual rates of14
received grants than those that did not is indicative of the possibility of unnecessary
subsidization.
b. Construction of Alternative  Subsidy Variables
As noted in the data section of this paper, the grants portion of the subsidy (gij)
for every firm is recorded in the Capital Stock Survey.  The loans portion (lij) was
estimated by matching the individual observations with the terms of the loans specified
in the Law.  The terms depend on the time and location of the investment, and whether
the firm qualifies as an exporter.  This information is available from the data on firm
investments and characteristics. The actual subsidy embodied in the loan depends on the
nominal rate of interest charged, the nominal rate of interest prevailing in the market,
expected inflation during the payback period of the loan, and on the length of this loan
period.  Our general approach to using this information to calculate the loan subsidy is
similar to that used in Litvin and Meridor (1983), Bregman (1985), and Bar-Nathan
(1989). 
There are two ways in which the subsidy data was used.  Section 3 of this paper
presents a theoretical model of the impact of subsidies based on an explicit application of
the neoclassical investment literature.  This model was applied to the data.  However,
before applying that model we first investigated a more ad hoc formulation. For each
firm at each point of time, each surviving investment was multiplied by the subsidy
ratio
18 and aggregated to provide data on the proportion of the capital stock which is
subsidized.  This calculation was performed for both the grants data (which is actual
                                                                                                                                                              
return observations, the high average rate of return of about 20% for these firms remains.
18 At this stage of the research we calculated the subsidy ratio for every firm from data on total
investments for every period of time (vintage), by using weighted averages of the different ratios of the
three types of capital available to us (structures, equipment and vehicles).  We will perform the15
data) and the grants + loans data (a mixture of actual and estimated data).  These
variables were used as characteristics of the firm to be included in an augmented
production function estimation similar to the heterogeneity controls approach of
Bregman, Fuss and Regev (1995) and Griliches and Regev (1995).  In this case, the
capital input is constructed as if subsidies were not present
19.
c. The  Regression Results
Table 4 contains OLS estimates of the parameters of the augmented Cobb-
Douglas production function.
20,21 The more flexible translog function was also
estimated, but since the results were similar to the simpler Cobb-Douglas specification,
the translog results are relegated to an appendix (Appendix 2).   The four columns of
results in Table 4 differ because of different versions of the subsidy variable and
different ways of measuring the capital input variable.
22 
In columns I and III, the capital input (LHON) is measured as the service flow
from the gross capital stock when the user cost of capital used to construct the aggregate
                                                                                                                                                              
disaggregated calculations in later work.  We do not expect the revised calculations to have a significant
influence on the results. 
19 To construct this variable, the aggregation theory outlined in section 3 was utilized, but the
implications of subsidies for the user cost of capital was ignored.
20  Definitions of the neumonics  representing the right hand side variables is contained in Appendix 1.
21  In previous work with this data set we have also attempted to provide instrumental variable
estimates to account for the possible endogeneity of the input variables.  The various results have never
been sensitive to this change in estimation method, so we did not pursue this alternative in the current
paper.
22 A general issue with respect to all four columns is how to treat rental expenditures.  The Israeli data
set has separate observations on the current dollar rental expenditures, unlike the U.S. manufacturing
survey data that include rents in the intermediate inputs expenditure data.  There are three possibilities:
(1) ignore the data,  (2) include it in materials (for comparability with U.S. results), (3) include it in
capital.  In previous work we ignored the information.  Here we include it in capital by assuming an
annual return of 12.5% on rented capital (rented capital=8*real rents).  This inclusion characterizes
both the regression results to follow and the previous descriptive statistics. A problem with the
inclusion of rents in capital is that we have no data on grants associated with rented capital.  We have
investigated all three possible treatments of rent and the regression results are not sensitive to the
choice. 16
capital is calculated ignoring the existence of investment subsidies.
23  In columns II and
IV, the capital service flow variable (LPCT) is calculated by applying the user cost of
capital variable that includes the subsidy adjustment (equation (11)) to estimate the
capital service flow.  By construction, since subsidies lower the cost of capital, they also
lower the estimated service flow from a given stock of capital. The interpretation is that
firms with access to subsidized (hence less expensive) capital will extend their purchases
of capital to capital with a lower marginal product and therefore the service flow from a
given capital stock will be reduced.
In columns I and II the subsidies variable is represented by the proportion of
(constant dollar) grants actually received as a proportion of the (constant dollar) capital
stock (GNT)
24.  An increase in this variable implies a greater degree of capital
subsidization.  In columns III and IV the subsidies variable CSB is calculated by adding
to the numerator of GNT the calculated non-grant subsidies (loans, tax concessions)
described  above.   This variable (CSB) represents our estimate of the total subsidy to
capital as a proportion of capital
25.  It is a mixture of actual grants observed and our
calculation of the additional subsidies the firms were entitled to receive as a result of
having qualified for the subsidy program in one of the various categories.  An increase in
CSB implies a greater degree of subsidization. 
Before we proceed to discuss the subsidy results, we first discuss the other
results of interest in Table 4.  Since these other results are not very sensitive to the
                                               
23 The gross definition of capital was used because the grants were calculated on a gross basis.  When the
production function was estimated without including the subsidy variables, the estimated structure was
invariant to whether the gross or net definitions of capital were used.
24 The variable used in the regression is LGNT = log (1+GNT).  The empirical results suggested that this
logarithmic transformation was the preferred way to deal with the fact that the majority of firms (60%) did
not receive grants. For such firms GNT=0.
25 Once again, the variable actually used in the regression is the logarithmic transformation LCSB =  log
(1+CSB).  17
different versions of subsidy and capital input variables used, we will use the results in
column I as representative. 
First, constant returns to scale appears to be a reasonable description of the
technology (the scale elasticity is 1.01
26).  Increases in the quality of capital and the
quality of labor result in increases in labor productivity (or equivalently, increases in
output or efficiency of production).  A unique variable that we have available is the
extent of shift work.  This variable is a direct measure of capital utilization.  Not
surprisingly, increases in the number of work-shifts within a twenty-four hour period has
a statistically significant positive impact on output through the more intensive utilization
of the capital stock.
27
Investment in R&D capital has a significant impact on labor productivity.
28,29
Firms that opened or closed during the period of our data sample had lower productivity
than continuing, established firms.  During those years in our sample when these firms
operated, new firms were 4.7% 
30 less productive, whereas firms that closed were 12.5%
less productive
31.  Several branches of industry had lower output per unit labor than the
                                               
26 Since all non-labor input variables and output are deflated by labor, 1+ the coefficient on the labor input
(LL) measures returns to scale (excluding the impact of R&D).
27 The estimated coefficient implies that a firm that moved from one shift to two shifts and doubled its
use of labor and materials inputs would double output.  Hence the utilization of capital would double.
28 In our formulation R&D capital plays a role in the production process analogous to structures and
equipment capital.  The variable used in the regression is LKRD = log (1+KRD) since KRD =0 for many
firms.  Due to this formulation, the estimate .13 is not the estimate of the R&D elasticity.  The elasticity
estimate is .13*[KRD/(1+KRD)], which is equal to 0.07 at the mean value of KRD for those observations
where KRD >0.  By comparison, the elasticity for physical capital is 0.06.
29 We also estimated the model with a “no R&D” dummy variable included. As was the case for
Griliches and Regev (1995), we obtained a statistically significant positive coefficient, which is
counterintuitive.  However, the change in specification had no impact on the coefficients associated
with the subsidy variables.   
30 Calculated as (exp(-.048) -1)*100.
31 Whether firms close is not independent of their productivity, so there is a potential simultaneity bias
associated with the variable CLS.  However, deleting CLS and OPN from the regressions in Table 4
did not change the other coefficients.  The fact that closed firms are less productive than other firms
suggests a possible selectivity bias in our sample which should be kept in mind.  Firms that closed prior
to 1990 are not observed in our sample.  Much of the subsidization activity took place prior to 1990.  If
a disproportionate number of low productivity firms that failed after a short existence and hence closed18
reference branch (electronics).  These branches were food, textiles, printing & paper, and
wood & minerals.  Of considerable interest is the fact that the Histadrut and Public
sectors, during the 1990-94 period, had higher productivity than the Private (reference)
sector.  This is a reversal of the results for the 1979-83 period reported in Bregman, Fuss
and Regev (1995), and suggests that firms in these sectors have made important relative
improvements in productive efficiency in recent years
32.
We now turn to an analysis of the subsidy results.   We consider first the results
in column I, where subsidies are measured in terms of actual grants and the capital input
is not adjusted for the presence of subsidies.  The coefficient on LGNT is significantly
negative, implying that subsidized firms produce less output per unit labor, ceteris
paribus.  For subsidized firms, the mean of LGNT is 0.104 and the maximum value is
.597.  Hence at the mean value, subsidized firms are 3.0%
33 less productive than
unsubsidized firms.  For heavily subsidized firms, the productivity shortfall ranges up to
15.8%
34.  The same calculations can be performed for the broader subsidy variable
LCSB.  For subsidized firms, this variable has a mean of 0.184 and a maximum value of
0.620.  From column III of Table 1 it can be seen that the corresponding productivity
shortfalls are 4.8% and 15.2% respectively. The productivity differential estimate is
somewhat higher for the average subsidized firm when a broader range of subsidies is
taken into account.  For heavily subsidized firms, grants dominate the subsidy-ratio
calculation, so that the two ways of calculating the subsidy ratio produce more similar
results.
The calculations above do not distinguish between productivity effects due to the
                                                                                                                                                              
prior to 1990 were subsidized firms, then we will underestimate the effect of subsidization on
productivity.
32 The apparent efficiency advantage of the Kibbutz firms may be an artifact of the likely
underreporting of the amount of labor used in production.19
incentives created by the subsidy system and productivity shortfalls that are due to
technical inefficiency.  Because subsidized capital is cheaper capital, subsidized firms
have a rational incentive to purchase additional lower productivity capital, so that for
such firms the flow of services from any observed capital stock should be lower.  As
noted earlier, we have taken this incentive into account by constructing a capital input
variable (PCT) for which the capital service prices used as weights explicitly incorporate
the subsidy effects.  The impact of this weighting procedure is to create a capital input
variable that is systematically lower for subsidized firms than the previous variable
HON.  It is also equal to HON for firms that did not receive subsidies.  We would expect
that the lower output observed for subsidized firms would at least in part be accounted
for by this revised capital input variable.  If this variable is correctly specified, and the
only output-lowering effect of subsidization is the rational purchase of additional lower
productivity capital by subsidized firms, the use of LPCT
35 in place of LHON should
wipe out the impact of the subsidy variable (LGNT or LCSB).  Inspection of columns II
and IV demonstrates that this is not the case
36. 
The coefficients of LGNT and LCSB are substantially reduced  (from -.289 to -
.175 and -.265 to -.123 respectively).  Approximately 50-60% of the productivity
shortfall observed which is associated with capital subsidization is estimated to be
attributable to technical inefficiency, while the remainder is caused by the rational choice
                                                                                                                                                              
33 Calculated as (exp(-.289*.104)-1)*100.
34 Calculated as (exp(-.289*.597)-1)*100.
 
35 LPCT is the logarithm of PCT.  LHON is the logarithm of HON.
36 
 It has been suggested to us that the apparently lower output may be due to the fact that a single
industry-specific output price is used to deflate the revenues of both subsidized and unsubsidized firms.
 If firms with lower cost capital passed on the lower costs in the form of lower prices, such a result
could be the case.  However, this would only occur if a pattern of market power existed such that 
unsubsidized firms did not have to lower their prices under competitive pressure from subsidized firms,
and there is no reason to believe this pattern exists.20
of firms, faced with relatively inexpensive capital, to overcapitalize.
37 
We now focus more closely on the question of overcapitalization.  We do so by
estimating a capital intensity equation, where the dependent variable is the capital stock
per unit of labor and the subsidy variable used is the grants ratio
38.   Table 5 contains the
results of this estimation.  We include relative input price and output variables, as well as
an extensive number of heterogeneity controls.  While we are particularly interested in
the impact of subsidization on the capital intensity (capital stock per unit of labor), we
begin by considering the results pertaining to the other variables in the equation.  The
capital- labor ratio is an increasing function of output, suggesting that the production
process is not homothetic.
39  Capital and labor are estimated to be substitutes, whereas
capital and materials are estimated to be complements.
Firms that export a greater proportion of their output are more capital-intensive. 
There is a tradeoff between quantity and quality of capital in satisfying production needs
(note the negative sign on the quality of capital). While capital intensity is estimated to
be an increasing function of the quality of labor (suggesting skilled labor-capital
complementarity), the effect is not statistically significant
40.  An interesting finding is
that capital-intensive production processes are associated with a lower proportion of
women in the workforce.  Capital-intensive production processes are also associated
                                               
37 Although we utilize a time series – cross section data set, the above results of the effects of subsidies
are primarily determined by the cross section component of the data.  We estimated both within (fixed
effects) and between versions of the model.  For the within version, the subsidy effects were
insignificant.  The between version produced results similar to those reported in the paper.  That the
fixed effects version did not yield significant results is not surprising, since for any individual firm
there would not be much variation in the proportion of subsidized capital over the five year period of
our time series component.  
38 An equation containing the subsidy ratio is not estimated since, due to its construction, this variable
is endogenous with respect to the price of capital services, a variable which appears as a right-hand side
variable.
39 While this result contradicts the use of the Cobb-Douglas production function above, recall that we also
estimated a translog function (which can be non-homothetic) with similar results regarding the productivity
effects of subsidies.
40 Capital includes structures, equipment and vehicles.  If the capital stock in this equation were21
with more shift work - suggesting a not surprising desire to utilize capital more intensely
when it represents a larger proportion of production costs.  R&D capital and physical
capital may be substitutes in production, but the effect is not statistically significant (see
the previous footnote for a possible rationale for lack of statistical significance). 
Firms that closed sometime during 1990-94 are significantly more capital
intensive than continuing firms.  We may be observing a period of low utilization of
capital just prior to closure. New firms are less capital intensive than continuing firms,
but not significantly so. There are significant differences in capital intensity among
branches, with electronics being the least capital intensive and chemicals & plastics
being the most capital-intensive.  The Kibbutz sector appears to be a relatively capital-
intensive sector.  This counterintuitive result is probably due to a systematic under-
reporting of the labor input, where labor hours supplied by Kibbutz members are not
always recorded.  The individual year dummy variables demonstrate the phenomenon of
an increase over time in the capital intensity of production, ceteris paribus.  This result is
consistent with labor-saving technical change. However, since an inter-temporal increase
in capital intensity is a basic feature of the data, the dummy variable coefficients
probably also reflect in part the impact of left-out variables and measurement errors. 
We now come to the effects of grants on the capital intensity of production.  It is
clear from the very significant positive coefficient of LGNT that subsidized firms are
more capital-intensive firms, even after accounting for the reduction in the capital
service price associated with subsidization.   There are two possible explanations for this
result.  First, we may have uncovered evidence of private allocative inefficiency on the
part of subsidized firms, although it should be noted that the capital used to construct the
intensity variable is the stock, not the service flow. Alternatively, the significant
                                                                                                                                                              
restricted to equipment, a statistically significant effect would probably be found.22
coefficients of the subsidy variables may be acting as controls for the mis-measurement
of the subsidy-adjusted capital service price.  Since we cannot account for all the
subsidies obtained by subsidized firms, our estimate of the subsidized price may be too
high and therefore may not fully represent the rational incentive to use a more capital
intensive production process. 
To this point we have concentrated primarily on documenting the productive
inefficiency associated with subsidized firms.  But subsidizing firms is part of the Israeli
government’s policy of encouraging regional development of industry.  It may be that
the only way to obtain regional development is to subsidize inefficient firms, who, as
part of the agreement will locate plants in development areas A and B as the pro quid pro
for obtaining the subsidies they need to compete.  Hence we cannot, at least at this stage
of the research, determine whether firms are inefficient because they are subsidized, or
are subsidized because they are inefficient.
41
One way to begin looking at this “chicken and egg” question is to compare the
profitability of subsidized firms with the profitability of unsubsidized firms.  We saw
from Tables 2 and 3 that, on average, subsidized firms have higher rates of return than
unsubsidized firms.  In fact, from Table 3 we can see that the rate of return for
subsidized firms in development area A exceeds that of unsubsidized firms in other areas
of Israel
42.  It does not appear that these firms have needed the subsidies to survive,
assuming the 1990-94 data is representative.  That such firms appear to be both less
                                               
41 It has been suggested that an alternative explanation for the apparent inefficiency observed in
subsidized firms is the fact that olim (new immigrants), who are probably less productive in their early
years in Israel, are concentrated in development areas and hence concentrated among the employees of
subsidized firms.  To explore this issue we estimated a specification that included a variable that
measured the proportion of the labor force that was made up of the new immigrants.  While this
variable had the expected significant negative coefficient, the coefficients of the subsidy variables were
unaffected.   
42 Once again the peculiar result for unsubsidized firms in development area A clouds the issue and will
need to be understood.23
efficient and more profitable remains a mystery as of this writing.  The mystery only
deepens when one considers that the gap in rates of return will widen if only non-
subsidized capital were used in the denominator of the rate of return calculation.   
5. Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
Perhaps for the first time, we have provided empirical evidence on the impact
that a program of subsidizing capital investment has on the nature of industrial
production.  We have estimated, for the case of Israeli industry, the empirical realization
of the incentive to over-invest in subsidized (cheaper) capital.  We have also found that
subsidized firms are likely to be technically inefficient - an effect which is separate from
the privately rational incentive to over-investment.
To this point we have only considered one side of the subsidy program - its costs.
 In the next stage of the research we need to consider the possible benefits to the
economy of a program of subsidizing capital accumulation.
Because the subsidy ratio reduces the user cost of capital it lowers the cost of
production (as long as some degree of input substitution occurs). The firm can thus
lower price and expand sales, which is a growth-inducing effect that also increases the
demand for labor. This effect of subsidies on output-supply and labor-demand
relationships represents a potential benefit of subsidization that we need to try to
estimate.  Whether the growth-inducing effect is greater than the adverse substitution
effect will help determine the net effect on the demand for labor (employment) which
results from the capital subsidy policy.   Since the ultimate goal of government-supplied
capital subsidies is to provide additional employment at reasonable cost, calculation of
the net effect will be of most use to policy makers. 24
In principal, the calculation of the net benefit should also consider the
opportunity cost of the subsidies - the alternative public resource investments
that could have been undertaken using the same budget.  The Law encouraged
investments in physical capital, while the rate of return for the economy may
have been much higher in investments in infrastructure and in R&D (a
reasonable assumption according to results of recent studies (Bregman &
Marom (1998), Griliches & Regev (1995))).   Devoting more resources to
these alternative investments might have resulted in higher growth rates and
additional employment in the development areas.  To the extent that greater
growth would have occurred, the use of public resources to fund physical
capital accumulation represents an additional degree of allocative inefficiency
which should not be ignored by policy makers when evaluating the subsidy
system.25
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Table 1*: Distribution of Firms by Incidence of Grants
             (percentage)
FIRMS: TOTAL WITHOUT GRANTS WITH GRANTS
Total Observations             727 434 293
Branch - all 100 61 39
  Food 100 61 39
  Textiles 100 64 36
  Printing, Paper 100 78 22
  Wood, Minerals 100 73 27
  Chemicals, Plastic 100 40 60
  Metals, Machinery 100 66 34
  Electronics 100 53 47
Size Group - all
  Up to 20 employees 100 92 8
  21-50 employees 100 80 20
  51-100 employees 100 58 42
  101-300 employees 100 46 54
  300 +  employees 100 37 63
Development Area - all
  A. 100 30 70
  B. 100 48 52
  C. 100 73 27
*  The figures are weighted and include imputations for missing data in the full sample.28
Table 2*:  Productivity, Capital Intensity, Grant Ratio
and Rate of Return, by size and Grants Availability
(thousands $, 1990 prices)
FIRMS: WITH GRANTS WITHOUT GRANTS TOTAL
SIZE GROUPS:
UP TO 20 employees
1. Labor productivity 72 54 55
2. Capital intensity 115 31 37
3. Grant ratio (%) 37.6 0 7.4
4. Rate of return (%) 3.5 0.7 1.3
21- 50 employees
1. Labor productivity 77 67 69
2. Capital intensity 98 33 43
3. Grant ratio (%) 23.4 0 7.6
4. Rate of return (%) 8.5 4.6 6.0
51-100 employees
1. Labor productivity 92 72 79
2. Capital intensity 102 40 62
3. Grant ratio (%)  17.5 0 11.6
4. Rate of return (%) 11.8 14.4 12.8
101- 300 employees
1. Labor productivity 99 99 99
2. Capital intensity 111 56 85
3. Grant ratio (%) 16.1 0 11.6
4. Rate of return (%) 12.2 16.6 13.5
300 +  employees
1. Labor productivity 119 87 103
2. Capital intensity 111 60 86
3. Grant ratio (%) 14.8 0 10.2
4. Rate of return (%) 15.0 7.0 12.2
All employees
1. Labor productivity 105 75 86
2. Capital intensity 109 44 68
3. Grant ratio (%) 16.3 0 10.3
4. Rate of return (%) 13.0 8.3 11.0
*  The figures are weighted and include imputations for missing data in the full sample.29
Table 3*: Productivity, Capital Intensity, Grant Ratio and Rate of
Return, by Area and Grants Acquisition
(thousands $, 1990 prices)
FIRMS: WITHOUT GRANTS WITH GRANTS TOTAL
AREAS:
DEVELOPMENT AREA A:
1. Labor productivity  75 90 85
2. Capital intensity 41 133 104
3. Grant ratio (%) 0 23.0 20.2
4. Rate of return (%) 24.0 11.2  12.8
DEVELOPMENT AREA B:
1. Labor productivity 68 108 88
2. Capital intensity 47 125 86
3. Grant ratio (%) 0 19.3 14.9
4. Rate of return (%) 7.8 11.2 10.3
DEVELOPMENT AREA C:
1. Labor productivity 76 115 86
2. Capital intensity 44 89 56
3. Grant ratio (%) 0 8.1 3.7
4. Rate of return (%) 6.8 15.3 10.4
TOTAL
1. Labor productivity 75 105 86
2. Capital intensity 44 109 68
3. Grant ratio (%) 0 16.3 10.3
4. Rate of return (%) 8.3 13.0 11.0
* The figures are weighted and include imputations for missing data in the full sample.30
Table 4: Production Functions, 1990-1994 (Cobb-Douglas)
Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity – LP (Production per Person-Year)
I II III IV
Coef.  T. Coef.  T. Coef.  T. Coef.  T.
Intermediate inputs (per p.y.) LM .758 142.5 .759 142.1 .757 141.6 .759 142.0
Capital services ( per  p.y.) LPCT .055 13.4 .055 13.3
Capital  intensity LHON .059 14.1 .060 14.3
Returns to Scale LL .007 1.8 .009 2.5 .008 2.3 .010 2.7
Capital  Subsidy LCSB -.265 -6.1 -.123 -2.9
Grants LGNT -.289 -5.6 -.175 -3.5
Quality of capital LQK .031 4.3 .028 3.8 .027 3.8 .025 3.5
Quality of labor LQL .097 1.7 .112 2.0 .099 1.8 .114 2.0
Capital Utilization SHFT .127 4.2 .137 4.6 .129 4.3 .138 4.6
 R&D capital services LKRD .128 10.4 .127 10.3 .126 10.3 .125 10.2
Mobility (ref.= stayers)
Closed   1991 - 1994 CLS -.133 -4.4 -.133 -4.4 -.132 -4.4 -.133 -4.4
Opened 1990 - 1994 OPN -.048 -3.2 -.047 -3.2 -.047 -3.2 -.047 -3.1
Branch (ref. = electronics) 
  Food                       FD -.114 -6.9 -.115 -7.0 -.115 -7.0 -.115 -7.0
  Textiles                   TX -.062 -3.8 -.064 -3.9 -.064 -3.9 -.065 -4.0
  Printing, paper             PA -.039 -2.3 -.041 -2.4 -.040 -2.3 -.041 -2.3
  Wood, minerals              LH -.031 -1.9 -.035 -2.1 -.034 -2.1 -.036 -2.1
  Chemicals, plastic          HM .004 .2 .006 .4 .004 .2 .006 .4
  Metals, machinery           MA .040 2.6 .039 2.6 .038 2.6 .039 2.6
Sector (ref. = private)     
  Reg. stock market          STCK .009 .7 .012 .9 .014 1.1 .015 1.1
  Histadrut                  HIST .068 4.5 .072 4.8 .072 4.8 .073 4.8
  Kibbutz                    KIBZ .121 8.7 .129 9.3 .128 9.1 .131 9.2
  Public sector              PUBL .092 3.5 .085 3.2 .090 3.5 .084 3.2
Year dummies (ref.= 1990)
Year  1991 .019  1.5 .019 1.5 .019 1.5 .019 1.5
Year  1992 .004  .3 .004 .3 .004 .3 .004 .4
Year  1993 -.016 -1.3 -.016 -1.3 -.016 -1.3 -.016 -1.3
Year  1994 -.017 -1.4 -.017 -1.3 -.018 -1.4 -.016 -1.3
Intercept                    1.272 44.2 1.268 43.9 1.274 44.3 1.265 43.8
Observations                 2907 2907 2907 2907
R2                        .925 .924 .925 .924
Root MSE                     .208 .208 .208 .20931
Table 5: “Demand” for Capital, 1990-1994
Dependent Variable: Capital Intensity LGK (Capital per Person-Year
Coef.  T.
Output LPTO .108 8.6
Price  Capital/labor LPKL -.573 -13.0
Price  Capital/Inputs LPKM .448 6.7
Export ratio EXP .003 4.5
Grants LGNT 2.370 11.3
Quality of capital LQK -.322 -12.6
Quality of labor LQL .162 0.8
Women  ratio WMN -.012 -13.0
Capital Utilization SHFT .005 4.1
R&D capital services LKRD -.020 -0.4
Mobility (ref.= stayers)
  Closed   1991 - 1994
  Opened 1990 - 1994 CLS .335 3.0
OPN -.016 -1.1
Branch (ref. = electronics) 
  Food                      
  Textiles                   FD .457 7.3
  Printing, paper             TX .591 8.9
  Wood, minerals              PA .330 5.0
  Chemicals, plastic          LH .287 4.6
  Metals, machinery           HM .666 11.8
MA .116 2.1
Sector (ref. = private)     
  Reg. stock market         
  Histadrut                  STCK .104 2.2
  Kibbutz                    HIST .202 3.6
  Public sector              KIBZ .177 3.4
PUBL .002 0.0
Year dummies (ref.= 1990)
  Year  1991 .069 1.5
  Year  1992 .117 2.6
  Year  1993 .167 3.6
  Year  1994 .213 4.5
Intercept                    .200 1.1
Observations                 2906
R2                        .509
Root MSE                     .76532
Appendix 1
List of variables for the production and factor demand functions
P      = Output per labor unit (person-year), constant prices
PTO = Total output, constant prices
M     = Intermediate inputs (materials and purchased services) per labor unit, constant prices
PCT  = Capital services adjusted for subsidies
HON = Capital services unadjusted for subsidies
GNT  = Rate of real capital grants to gross capital.  [ LGNT=log(1+GNT)]
CSB  = Rate of total calculated and real subsidy (including GNT) to gross capital.
 LCSB = log [1+(PSB-CGNT+GNT)], when: PSB   =calculated total subsidies,
CGNT = calculated grant
QK     = Quality of capital - Ratio of new capital (investment in last five years) to total capital
QL     = Quality of labor - proportion of engineers and technicians to total employment (index, average    
               1990-1994)
SHFT= Indicator of capital utilization - index of shift work
KRD  = R&D capital services,   [LKRD = log (1+KRD)]
EXP   = Export ratio (of sales, percentage, 1990-1994)
WMN = Percentage of employees that are female
PL      = Cost of labor (wages including benefits) per hour
PM     = Intermediate inputs price index
PK     = User cost of capital (relative to gross capital price index)
Dummy variables:
Mobility - CLS = Firms that closed between 1991 and 1994
OPN = New firms that opened in 1990 - 1994
Industry -              FD = Food ￿               
Ownership Sector -  STCK.......
Year     -1991.....1994  33
Appendix 2: Production Functions, 1990-1994 (Translog)
Dependent Variable: Production – LP
I II III IV
Coef.  T. Coef.  T. Coef.  T. Coef.  T.
Intermediate inputs LM .197 6.1 .181 5.6 .215 6.8 .180 5.6
Labor LL .628 21.1 .621 21.3 .612 21.2 .625 21.4
Capital services LPCT .182 9.7 .181 9.7
Capital input LHON .138 7.5 .157 8.7
(LL)2 .131 10.9 .132 11.6 .134 11.6 .132 11.6
(LM)2 .140 18.5 .150 19.5 .141 18.8 .150 19.5
(LHON)2 / (LPCT)2 .005 1.6 .016 4.2 .016 4.4 .016 4.2
LL*LM -.117 -16.5 -.118 -16.8 -.117 -16.6 -.119 -16.9
LL*LHON  / LL*LPCT -.000 -.1 .002 .4 -.001 -.3 .002 .4
LM*LHON / LM*LPCT -.015 -3.6 -.028 -6.3 -.023 -5.2 -.028 -6.2
Capital  Subsidy LCSB -.257 -6.4 -.115 -3.1
Grants LGNT -.191 -4.2 -.139 -3.1
Quality of capital LQK .019 2.9 .025 3.8 .024 3.7 .022 3.4
Quality of labor LQL .158 3.0 .132 2.6 .118 2.4 .134 2.7
Women ratio WMN -.001 -2.8 -.001 -2.6 -.001 -2.5 -.001 -2.6
Capital Utilization SHFT .002 6.4 .002 5.8 .002 5.5 .002 5.8
 R&D capital services LKRD .082 5.7 .113 10.1 .112 10.1 .112 10.1
Mobility (ref.= stayers)
  Closed   1991 - 1994 CLS -.088 -3.1 -.111 -4.1 -.113 -4.2 -.111 -4.1
  Opened 1990 - 1994 OPN -.052 -3.8 -.049 -3.6 -.051 -3.8 -.048 -3.6
Branch (ref. =electr.) 
  Food                       FD -.121 -7.7 -.118 -7.9 -.118 -7.9 -.119 -7.9
  Textiles                   TX -.117 -7.0 -.114 -7.0 -.117 -7.9 -.115 -7.1
  Printing, paper             PA -.028 -1.7 -.021 -1.3 -.020 -7.9 -.021 -1.3
  Wood, minerals              LH -.054 -3.4 -.053 -3.5 -.054 -7.9 -.054 -3.6
  Chemicals, plastic          HM -.002 -.1 .006 .4 .002 -7.9 .006 .5
  Metals, machinery           MA -.010 -.7 .003 .2 .003 -7.9 .003 .2
Sector (ref. = private)     
  Reg. stock market          STCK .036 3.0 .030 2.5 .032 2.6 .032 2.7
  Histadrut                  HIST .047 3.6 .052 3.8 .050 3.7 .053 3.9
  Kibbutz                    KIBZ .152 11.1 .139 11.2 .138 10.9 .142 11.2
  Public sector              PUBL .060 2.1 .034 1.3 .031 1.3 .033 1.3
Year dummies (ref.= 1990)
  Year  1991 .012 1.1 .012 1.1 .012 1.1 .012 1.1
  Year  1992 .012 1.1 .011 1.0 .011 1.0 .011 1.0
  Year  1993 -.005 -.5 -.005 -.4 -.006 -.5 -.005 -.4
  Year  1994 -.023 -2.0 -.025 -2.2 -.026 -2.3 -.024  -2.2
Intercept                    2.357 29.2 2.338 29.4 2.273 28.7 2.335 29.3
R2                        .987 .988 .988 .988
Root MSE                     .185 .186 .186 .186
Mean Elastisities EL 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
EK 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
EM 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.75